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Abstract
The Omagh bombing in August 1998 produced many of the
problems documented in other major incidents. An initial imbalance
between the demand and supply of clinical resources at the local
hospital, poor information due to telecommunication problems, the
need to triage victims and the need to transport the most severely
injured significant distances were the most serious issues. The
Royal Group Hospitals Trust (RGHT) received 30 severely injured
secondary transfers over a 5-hour period, which stressed the
hospital’s systems even with the presence of extra staff that arrived
voluntarily before the hospital’s major incident plan was activated.
Many patients were transferred to the RGHT by helicopter, but
much of the time the gained advantage was lost due to lack of a
helipad within the RGHT site. Identifying patients and tracking
them through the hospital system was problematic. While the
major incident plan ensured that communication with the relatives
and the media was effective and timely, communication between
the key clinical and managerial staff was hampered by the need to
be mobile and by the limitations of the internal telephone system.
The use of mobile anaesthetic teams helped maintain the flow of
patients between the Emergency Department and radiology,
operating theatres or the intensive care unit (ICU). The mobile
anaesthetic teams were also responsible for efficient and timely
resupply of the Emergency Department, which worked well. In the
days that followed many victims required further surgical
procedures. Coordination of the multidisciplinary teams required
for many of these procedures was difficult. Although only seven
patients required admission to adult general intensive care, no ICU
beds were available for other admissions over the following 5 days.
A total of 165 days of adult ICU treatment were required for the
victims of the bombing.
Introduction
Although the circumstances of all major incidents are
different, they show many similarities in the problems they
pose to those responding and in the factors limiting the
effectiveness of the response [1]. The quality of both the
response and the pre-existing health care system may be
significant determinants of the ultimate impact of the event
[2,3]. Although problems in areas such as communication,
coordination and training have been documented [2,4–8],
these problems are often still neglected [9,10]. While many
institutions/government agencies have drawn up major
incident plans (MIPs), these are often missing vital elements
such as education/training and a coordinated approach to
communication [6,10]. Most MIPs assume that the fabric of
the acute health-care system will be intact. While the recent
Indian Ocean Tsunami proved this to be a false assumption, it
had been previously demonstrated in more localized
catastrophic events [2,3,11]. MIPs also assume an epicentre
for a major event, with problems reducing with increasing
distance from that point — a ‘ground zero’. This may not be
the case in possible future disaster scenarios [12].
The Royal Group Hospitals Trust (RGHT) response to the
Omagh bombing included elements of good practice
developed in emergency responses during 25 years of
terrorist activity [13–17]. Nevertheless, we made some
decisions that, in hindsight, could have been better and our
response had limitations due to factors both inside and
outside our control.
Review of events
At 15:10 hours on Saturday 15 August 1998, a car bomb
exploded in Omagh, Northern Ireland. Hundreds of shoppers
had been evacuated from the town centre ‘for safety’ to an
area adjacent to the car bomb due to confusion and/or
misinformation regarding the location of the bomb.
Immediately following the explosion, many victims were taken
1.5 km to the small 158-bed local hospital (Tyrone County
Hospital [TCH]), whose staff were confronted with a sudden
influx of patients with major and minor injuries, of the dead
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and of distraught relatives. Following the explosion, all local
fixed-line telephones were non-operational. The mobile phone
networks were severely overloaded to the point that it was
almost impossible to make or receive calls for many hours.
Local hospital staff that were off-duty either heard the
explosion or received news of it via radio, television or by
word of mouth. Many staff reported to the hospital and staff
from nearby hospitals supplemented these over the first few
hours. Nevertheless, the imbalance between the number of
injured and local resources was quickly realized. Two
hundred and nine patients received initial treatment in TCH
while a further 127 were taken directly to three other
hospitals 30–60 min away.
At 18:00 hours, ambulance control informed the RGHT, the
regional referral centre for major trauma, that two or three
patients were en route by air. No information was available on
the types of injury, the estimated time of arrival or whether
further patients would require transfer. The RGHT activated
its MIP at 18:15 hours. Three victims arrived on the RGHT
site by military helicopter at 18:25 hours. Many of the
RGHT’s staff had arrived as volunteers, having heard of the
evolving situation on television and radio. This included
medical and nursing staff, technical, administrative and
domestic services staff. The RGHT received 20 blast victims
between 18:25 and 22:00 hours, and received a further nine
victims by 01:00 hours the next morning — many transferred
by military helicopter (in groups of two or three). All
transferred patients were admitted via the Emergency
Department (ED) — there were no direct admissions to
general or specialist wards. Seventeen of 27 adult patients
were triaged/managed in the resuscitation room, and the
remainder in cubicles within the ED. Three children were
transferred directly to the Royal Belfast Hospital for Sick
Children situated on the same campus. Six operating rooms
were opened in anticipation of emergency surgery. A
maximum of four theatres were required at any one time. In
the first 24 hours after the blast, a wide spectrum of surgical
teams utilized a total of 58 hours of operating theatre time.
Twenty-nine people died as a result of this incident; 27 at the
scene or in/on the way to the local hospital. One patient, a 43-
year-old woman, died in the resuscitation room of the RGHT.
She had sustained severe liver laceration/contusion, which
had been explored and packed in Omagh. She was profoundly
shocked on arrival in the RGHT. Reopening of the patient’s
laparotomy wound in the resuscitation room revealed a large
peri-renal haematoma with massive lower abdominal bleeding,
probably from a torn inferior vena cava. She died within 1 hour
of arrival. The final victim (a 62-year-old man) died of
sepsis/multiple organ failure in intensive care after 21 days.
The remaining 28 patients transferred to the RGHT survived.
After receiving 30 patients transferred from Omagh, seven
adult intensive care unit (ICU) beds and two paediatric ICU
beds were filled in the RGHT. The general intensive care unit
(GICU) had no available beds for 5 days. In total, 152 days of
care were required for the bomb victims admitted to the
GICU. In addition, 23 days of care were provided by the
cardiac surgical ICU acting as an overflow GICU. These
figures exclude the requirement for paediatric ICU care.
Further multimedia material on this terrorist bombing is
available online (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/troubles/
agreement/omagh.shtml and http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/
omagh/).
The major incident plan
The RGHT’s MIP was activated without definitive triggering
information being received and before the arrival of the first
casualty. This was on the grounds that two or three patients
were en route and it was ‘highly probable’ that many more
would follow. The MIP fulfilled its purpose; to ensure the
establishment of a ‘control team’, to designate those in
charge of key services and to provide a cascade system
mobilizing personnel. Our MIP designates an ED coordinator
and a surgical coordinator, and also provides a framework to
handle issues such as maximizing available beds, supplies,
pharmacy, public relations, pathology services and
counselling. The MIP does not deal with clinical issues. These
are the province of the coordinators or may be addressed in
departmental major incident response plans.
Due to its proximity to the blast and the communications
blackout, TCH did not have the chance to institute a MIP
prior to the arrival of blast victims. Since it was Saturday
afternoon, only minimal staff were on site and a telephone
call-out of appropriate staff (which would have been
insufficient anyway given the size of the hospital) was not
possible. The blast occurred near to the local bus depot and
a bus was mobilized (it is unclear with what authority) to take
the injured to the TCH. Unfortunately this meant that a large
number of ‘walking wounded’ and victims with probable non-
life-threatening injuries reached TCH first, since these were
easier to move the short distance to the bus. At this point
TCH had no clear information on the situation, and with only
one inexperienced doctor in attendance initially there was no
early triage at TCH. This meant that when ambulances arrived
with the most severely injured victims, the ED was already
overstretched — as was the case in small hospitals near the
sites of the Madrid bombings [18]. The situation did improve
gradually and the arrival of staff from other hospitals
responding to media reports was a major help. The problems
in TCH were compounded by the fact that many of the
victims were related to, or known by, the hospital staff
treating them. Distraught relatives in the ED were difficult to
manage in the early stages.
Communication issues
External communication
The telecommunications problems occurred because part of
the local conventional ‘fixed-line’ network (including connections403
to TCH) was directly damaged in the blast, and because all
mobile phone networks quickly became overloaded due to
heavy use by the public and arriving media personnel. This
meant that the primary hospital (TCH) had no direct means of
communicating with its off-duty staff, with other hospitals
receiving victims evacuated from the scene or with the RGHT
in Belfast, which supplies the majority of tertiary referral
services for the region. Major problems with communication
have been reported in other mass incidents [2,4,5,8],
sometimes with fatal consequences [5].
If the mobile (cellular) phone systems become non-
operational, a facility exists that enables emergency
services to retain the ability to use some mobile phones.
This facility is termed access overload control for cellular
radio telephones (ACCOLC) and involves one or more cells
in the normal networks being ‘stood-down’ and the
activation of an alternative network for emergency
communication only. Application has to be made (in
advance to [UK] central government) for specified
telephones to have access to such a network. ACCOLC
mobile phones are usually held by incident officers,
communication officers and others in the command and
control structure of a major incident. The decision to move
to ACCOLC lies with the police service.
Activation of ACCOLC was considered in the hours following
the explosion but was not activated for three reasons.
Incident management relied on radio communication and so
was not handicapped by the lack of mobile telephone
communication. Secondly, the use of ACCOLC would not
have allowed communication with TCH since it did not have
any ACCOLC registered phones. Finally, the mobile network
was still operational but grossly overloaded. With persistence
and good fortune, it was still possible to make mobile calls.
To prevent this by switching off the conventional networks
was viewed at the time as ‘anti-humanitarian’. It might also
result in more people going to TCH in an attempt to track
down relatives or friends.
ACCOLC has never been activated in Northern Ireland but
was included in contingency planning for the ‘Millennium bug’
in 1999/2000. Despite enquiries, the authors could not find a
confirmed activation of ACCOLC anywhere in the United
Kingdom.
By approximately 20:00 hours it was realized that, since the
Regional Ambulance Control Centre could communicate with
ambulances at TCH and with ambulances sitting at the
RGHT, information could be relayed indirectly between the
two hospitals. This allowed the passage of some clinical
information during the remainder of the telephone blackout.
The communication problems could also have been eased by
direct ambulance-to-hospital radio communication. The lack
of such a system has been an issue in the region for many
years.
Television and radio were a potential means of mobilizing
staff, as has been noted after other major incidents [19–21].
Immediately after the explosion, TCH needed experienced
surgeons but did not ask for this specifically. This tendency to
forget to ask for specific assistance, when receiving wide-
spread but non-specific help from volunteers, was also noted
in the response to the Loma Prieta earthquake [8]. We
should consider the use of television and radio in a more
specific and deliberate way; for example, mobilizing off-duty
hospital staff during a major incident in a pre-meditated
fashion. It should be remembered, however, that in Omagh
the media contributed to the collapse of telephone communi-
cation, as noted in previous major incidents [19,21].
Broadband access to the Internet and satellite-linked devices
(which do not depend on telephone landline integrity) have
become valuable in receiving information in more recent
major incidents [4] and may help reduce the amount of
telephone and radio ‘traffic’ during major incidents. In the
initial 6 hours after the Hillsborough Football Stadium
Disaster, there were 1.75 million attempted telephone calls to
the local telephone exchange — 250,000 (14%) were
processed [21]. Efficient handling of information requires
‘communication triage’ [22] to ensure that critical information
is delivered first to those who need it most. This might be
possible in the future using e-mail if networks are secure and
PDA-type devices are widely used in healthcare.
What disadvantages in the RGHT stemmed from the lack of
communication with TCH? The scale of the event was
unknown; six operating theatres were made ready but only
four were ever required simultaneously. One patient was
discharged from the GICU and three others transferred from
the GICU to the cardiac surgical ICU with no certainty that
those beds would actually be required. The mix and number
of specialist surgeons and anaesthetists needed was unclear.
Unreliable and sketchy information has been shown to
produce inappropriate decision-making and deployment [4].
Patients arrived within 15 min of the hospital activating its
MIP. With many senior staff living 20–30 min away, this could
have been disastrous had staff not activated themselves in
response to media information. Stress among staff in the
early phase may have been lessened if they had a greater
knowledge of what to expect.
Internal communication
We found internal communication at the RGHT between
specific individuals coordinating activity in the key areas (ED,
operating theatres, GICU and cardiac surgical ICU) difficult,
as has been found elsewhere [4]. Due to the need to be
mobile, the hospital telephone system was of limited use and
on many occasions the coordinators had to meet face to
face. This was practical because the GICU, the ED and the
operating theatre complex were close together, but with a
different floor-plan it might have led to significant difficulty. At
Bellevue Hospital, medical students were used on 11
September as ‘runners’ since they were familiar with staff,
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equipment and hospital layout [4]. The problems of
intrahospital communication between teams in different
clinical areas and the potential use of mobile radios/pagers
have been discussed previously [4,17,19,21].
Public Relations were specifically charged with the task of
liaising with the media and with relatives. Senior doctors and
nurses were asked to contribute only when required, thus
allowing them to remain focused on their main tasks. The
early distribution of accurate and relevant information to
relatives and victims with minor injuries may be very important
in preventing problems post trauma [23].
Logistics
Mode of transfer and distribution of patients
Because of its small size, excellent road system and lack of
traffic congestion, Northern Ireland has not frequently seen
helicopter transport used to ferry critically injured patients to
(or between) hospitals. The nature of this incident and the
availability of military helicopters made their use appropriate.
However the only real advantage, time saved [24], was
partially lost due to the need to land a considerable distance
from the hospital and transfer the patients to the ED by
ground ambulance.
Although initially there was a huge mismatch between
resources at TCH and clinical need, and there was an early
lack of triage, the distribution of casualties (two-thirds to TCH
and one-third to three other primary hospitals) helped to
reduce the initial problems. The actions of the ambulance
personnel in Omagh and the good sense of the public who,
on seeing the situation at TCH, took those with lesser injuries
elsewhere, should be commended. This is in contrast to the
events in Nottingham after the Kegworth air crash [19].
All trauma-related surgical specialties (neurosurgery, thoracic
surgery, vascular surgery and fracture, plastic/burns, etc.) and
the largest GICU in the region were available in one
institution in Belfast. This meant mandatory triage (only those
with the perceived need for such services were transferred to
the RGHT). Some victims perceived to have need for fracture
treatment only were also transferred to Altnagelvin hospital
(30 miles away). In this regard triage worked well, with no
inappropriate transfers. Unfortunately, the 70-mile transfer
from TCH to the RGHT was too far for one patient with major
abdominal haemorrhage (see above).
Patient reception and tracking at the RGHT
The RGHT admitted 27 adult victims and three paediatric
victims in a period of less than 6 hours. Their subsequent
progress through the hospital system is summarized in
Figure 1 and Table 1. The RGHT normally operates a double
portal of entry when dealing with single or multiple victims of
trauma. This means such patients may only be admitted via
the resuscitation room or the GICU. In this incident the GICU
was fully occupied making beds available and accepting the
three early admissions, so there was a single portal of entry
via the ED. Such a policy is designed to avoid the problems
such as those after the Clapham rail crash, when the opening
of a second entrance to the ED resulted in patients with
significant injuries being processed as minor casualties [25].
The next day, it was difficult to check on the less severely
injured patients because they were scattered throughout
several wards within the hospital. Two patients requiring
relatively minor surgery were ‘discovered’ on Sunday
morning. It was unclear when or how they reached the
orthopaedic unit. There was a board in the ED specifically to
track patients. It was, however, tucked away in a side cubicle.
Although Public Relations were using this in their work with
relatives, the surgical teams reviewing patients were unaware
of the tracking board. Difficulties in tracking patients moving
between different locations and professional groups are
common [5]. In future, the Internet may provide an excellent
method of tracking patients [26] but may be vulnerable like
other communications systems [27].
One injury was missed due to poor communication. A patient
underwent surgery 24 hours after the explosion for repair of a
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Figure 1
Patient flow after the explosion. TCH, Tyrone County Hospital; RGHT,
Royal Group Hospitals Trust; ED, Emergency Department; RBHSC,
Royal Belfast Hospital for Sick Children; GICU, general intensive care
unit; CSICU, cardiac surgical intensive care unit; PICU, paediatric
intensive care unit.
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carotid artery aneurysm. He had multiple orthopaedic and
blast/soft tissue injuries. It was recorded on his anaesthetic
sheet that an X-ray showed ‘intracranial metallic debris’ but
this was not known by the neurosurgical staff for a further
18 hours. He did not require any additional surgery for this.
Patient identification
The RGHT has, for 20 years, used an identity card system
based on letters as temporary identifiers. Eight hours after the
explosion, two patients (one in an orthopaedic ward and one
in the GICU) had been ‘identified’ with the same name.
Sorting this out required almost 1 hour of senior medical time.
Malone has suggested the use of identification cards, which
could be standardized for all (UK) hospitals [19]. Such cards
would be used throughout the management of all patients of
unknown or doubtful identity, co-existing with their ‘real’
identity, when known. This would have avoided the earlier
stated problem of identification and the resultant emotional
stress to staff and relatives. Such problems occurred after the
Oklahoma bomb [28] and diverted staff from their main tasks.
Personnel issues
Due to its proximity to the blast and the telecommunications
difficulties, the biggest problem at TCH was the lack of
medical and nursing staff. The decision by doctors and nurses
from other hospitals to drive to TCH and offer help was not a
planned response, but was of great assistance. Clinical staff
responding to a major incident by working outside their normal
environment can be counterproductive [5]. On this occasion, it
appears to have worked since the staff concerned were mainly
medical trainees in anaesthesia (who are used to working in
the ED and frequently move from one hospital to another as
part of their training) and ED nurses. Working within an
appropriate role in a MIP improves effectiveness [29].
Allocation of staff at the RGHT was planned to ensure the
initial response could be sustained beyond 24 hours if
required. Six operating rooms were available but only four
were utilized. This was because the urgency of cases waiting
for surgery did not justify six theatres working simultaneously.
The staff ‘saved’ by withholding two unjustified operating
theatres from service helped man four anaesthetic teams that
assisted in the ED and transferred critically ill patients for
scans, X-rays and to the operating theatre/ICU.
One GICU consultant, arriving at 18:45 hours, went home
despite the arrival of bomb victims since two GICU
consultants were already there. He returned at 23:00 hours
to relieve his colleagues at a time when many patients were
being admitted to the GICU. In some disaster situations there
may in fact be plenty of staff [18], but it may be difficult to get
staff to leave, take a break or to delay coming to work [8].
The attitude of staff in volunteering and turning up in such
situations has been noted previously [17–21,28,30] and is a
recognized behaviour [31]. In particular, the readiness of
anaesthetists to volunteer in this incident was striking and has
been noted by many authors [20,21,30]. The presence of a
ward clerk in the GICU helped prevent inappropriate
diversion of clinical staff to deal with telephones, media, and
so on, and this was complemented by the Public Relations
staff, mobilized as part of the MIP.
Supplies
The anaesthetic teams were also responsible for resupplying
the ED with drugs, equipment and disposables. These were
transferred from theatres and ICUs in parallel with the patient
transfers being performed by these teams. This is similar to a
‘just in time’ resupply strategy used by some private
companies. It was obviously important to ensure the reserve,
although modest, guaranteed that supplies would not run out.
Using this strategy, there were no recorded supply shortfalls
in the ED. The problems of oversupply, and potential wastage
have been documented in the response to the Oklahoma
Available online http://ccforum.com/content/9/4/401
Table 1
Admitting units and outcome of patients
Admitting unit Number of patients Additional information Outcome
ICU 7 Burns (2), head injury (3), orthopaedics/ophthalmic  6 survived, 1 deceased
surgery (1), vascular/orthopaedics/neurosurgery (1)
Burns 3 Survived
Neurosurgery 5 Survived
Orthopaedics 6 Survived
Thoracic surgery 1 Survived
Ophthalmic surgery 4 Enucleation (2), bilateral enucleation (1) Survived
Children’s hospital 3 ICU/abdominal injury, ICU/burns, burns Survived
Emergency Department/ 1 Abdominal injury — laparotomy in resuscitation room Deceased
vascular general surgery
ICU, intensive care unit.406
bombing [29] and the world Trade Centre attack [4]. In the
latter case, one clinical department estimated a loss of
$20,000 in consumables and equipment.
Planning ongoing surgery
The logistical problems arising in hospital over the period
soon after a major incident have received little attention.
Stevens and Partridge [25] noted that the disruptive effect of
the Clapham rail crash lasted up to 1 week, while Sharpe and
Foo documented the problems delivering an adequate plastic
surgical service after the Bradford city fire [30]. Between day
2 and day 5 following the Omagh bombing, 26 hours of
theatre time (i.e. almost four normal working days) was
devoted to further surgical treatment of the victims (this
excludes the three paediatric patients). Many of the ICU
patients required multiple surgical teams to be involved in
procedures. In some cases it proved difficult/impossible to
ensure all the relevant disciplines were available and,
occasionally, some staff (e.g. plastic surgeons) were double-
booked in different theatre suites. Due to the nature of the
injuries and the length of procedures required, plastic surgery
was particularly hard pressed. The increased workload for the
ICU lasted for 2 months after the incident.
What factors could have made this incident
better or worse?
The strengths and weaknesses of our response to this event
are summarized in Table 2. Had the bombing occurred in any
neighbouring towns that do not have a hospital, the problems
would have been greater in terms of transfer from the scene
to hospital and in terms of triage. Difficult decisions regarding
whether to go to the nearest hospital (TCH) or to be
transferred immediately for specialist treatment at the RGHT
did not have to be made at the scene in Omagh. A bomb in a
neighbouring town would not have affected Omagh’s fixed-
line telephone system. This and the additional time before
casualties arrived would have been an advantage to TCH.
The timing of the explosion (Saturday afternoon) meant that
hospitals had no elective surgery and so on occurring but
therefore had minimal staff on-site. This was a disadvantage
in TCH, a small local hospital, but a big advantage in the
RGHT, a regional centre with more staff. When many of the
patients arrived in Belfast both day and night nursing shifts
were in the hospital. The staffing and activity levels of a
hospital at the time of a major incident may be a vital (but
uncontrollable) factor in the response [18].
It may be forgotten in such incidents that other (‘routine’)
clinical problems arise to divert resources [7]. In the GICU,
three patients unconnected with the explosion became
unstable during the night and required approximately 3 hours
of medical time. In addition, at 06:00 hours, a retrieval team
had to make a 3-hour round trip to collect a patient with a
serious closed head injury.
The number of patients requiring tertiary referral services was
less than 10% of the total number of patients who came to
the four primary hospitals. Only 3–4% of blast victims needed
admission to the ICU. This pattern (a huge number of non-life-
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Table 2
The system’s response to bombing: strengths and weaknesses
Strengths in system’s response Weaknesses in system’s response
Clinical staff going to Omagh to help initial response External communications poor and no back-up with ACCOLC during 
telephone blackout
Distribution of victims between four hospitals for initial care No direct communication between ambulance and hospitals
Triggering of the MIP at the RGHT without waiting for absolute proof  Delayed realization of the use of ambulance control to relay 
that it was required communication between TCH and the RGHT
Utilization of day-shift staff and night-shift staff at the RGHT and having  Internal communication reliant on overloaded internal telephone 
replacements for later in the incident response system and face-to-face meetings
Public Relations staff tasked with ensuring good quality, timely  Little communication between hospitals regarding victims’ identity and 
information for relatives status (for families with victims in more than one hospital)
Appropriate triage of small number of patients for tertiary care to  Advantages of helicopter negated by lack of previous experience and 
regional centre no helipad at regional centre
Availability of all trauma-related specialties on one site  GICU busy initially, discharging and transferring patients to vacate 
at the RGHT beds. Too few beds in system for a larger incident
Single portal of entry to the RGHT to avoid missed injury and direct  Patient identity mistaken due to early acceptance of spurious 
admission to surgical wards information
System for tracking patients in regional centre not used by surgical 
teams for follow-up
ACCOLC = access overload control for cellular radio telephones; GICU, general intensive care unit; MIP, major incident plan; RGHT, Royal Group
Hospitals Trust; TCH, Tyrone County Hospital.407
threatening injuries and a relatively small number of patients
needing critical care) is the normal injury pattern in terrorist
bombing [16,18,32,33]. Had the proportion requiring ICU
admission been higher, there would have been significant
problems providing critical care in a system where ICU bed
occupancy often exceeds 90% [34].
Discussion/lessons learned
Recommendations
1. Direct hospital-to-ambulance communication must be
available for use in a major incident.
2. Hospital pagers or radios should be issued (or re-
allocated) to those coordinating clinical activity in
separate areas of the hospital.
3. Allocating numbers/letters to unidentified patients should
be done in only one area. This should over-ride any
labelling made in a previous hospital. Labels with the
appropriate identifying number/letter should be tied/
attached to the patient. The letter designation should not
be abandoned until there is irrefutable proof of the
patient’s real identity.
4. A system for tracking the location, destination and clinical
team responsible for all patients should be available and
its existence widely disseminated. The number of units
admitting patients should be minimized to facilitate follow-
up.
5. A hospital such as the RGHT should have a helipad and a
system to quickly transport patients from the pad to the
resuscitation area.
Corrective actions since 1998
1. The ambulance service now has mobile phone
communication from all emergency ambulances, which
allows ambulance-to-hospital communication if required.
Planning is underway for the introduction of digital trunk
radio in 2006/2007. This will be the standard radio
system for all emergency services and will allow the
‘patching’ of digital trunk radio into the telephone system
if required.
2. Hospital pagers — no official change as yet. Since 1998
the ownership and use of mobile phones has increased
dramatically and has supplanted the pager as the
commonest means of contacting staff off-site. The use of
mobile phones for intrahospital communication, however,
has been hampered by worries regarding electromedical
interference [35,36]. Studies now suggest that
electromedical interference may be less of a problem than
previously suggested and that the zone of risk for
electromedical interference is limited to 1 metre or less
around susceptible equipment [37–39].
3. Identity cards — recommendations have been enacted.
4. A revision of the MIP in the RGHT calls for the
establishment of a tracking board in the ED and also calls
for the transfer of patients from a designated ward to
empty beds throughout the hospital. All victims from a
major incident suitable for general ward care should be
cohorted in the designated ward, making tracking and
reviewing patients simpler and quicker.
5. A new hospital block has been designed and is due for
completion in 2008/2009. It houses the new ED and the
GICU, and has direct (same-level) communications with
the existing theatres. It will have a helipad on the roof
serviced by a dedicated lift.
6. The MIP requires a senior surgeon to act as coordinator
for surgical activity in the days following a major event.
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